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1. Introduction 
The liberalization and globalization processes resulted in a rapid development of the 
investment banking industry in all the industrialized countries before the burst of the  
financial crisis in 2007. Investment banks primarily engage in the issuance of equity or 
debt securities and in mergers and acquisitions (M&A) advisory services. In addition, 
investment banks’ activities include trading, securities, and merchant banking and 
investment management services.  The wide operational spectrum of the investment 
banking industry has significantly increased the importance of these financial 
institutions for the global financial system.  
 
The high level of financial integration in the first half of the 2000 decade has led to a 
rapid growth of the investment banking sector, particularly in the G7 and Switzerland, 
(Tomljanovich and Ying 2005; Morana, 2008; Baglioni et al., 2013). Investment bank 
presence both in terms of number of institutions and operations is centred in these 
countries (Kalemli-Ozcan, 2012; Thomson Reuters, 2012). The development of 
investment banking activities reached its peak in 2006, when the industry’s total income 
in the G7 and Switzerland amounted to 80.67 (US$bn). In particular, investment 
banking earnings constituted 62% of total bank income in the US and 30% of the gross 
output of the UK economy in 2006 (Thomson Reuters, 2007; Burgess, 2011). However, 
this strong growth came to an abrupt end due to the financial crisis in 2007. The 
investment banking sector in the G7 and Switzerland experienced a considerable 
deceleration in activity as revenue dropped more than half from its highest point in 2006, 
reaching a total value of 39.07 (US$bn) in 2008. The industry as a whole has been 
profoundly reformed by the turmoil. 2  The crisis revealed that investment banking 
activities are highly complex and interconnected (Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 2010; 
Adrian and Shin, 2010), particularly between US and European investment banks 
(Eichengreen, 2012). As a consequence the transmission of the US sub-prime mortgage 
meltdown led to a major recession in the G7 and Switzerland.  
 
In response to the 2007 financial crisis, US regulators passed the Dodd-Frank Act 
(2010). This Act requires investment banks to have higher capital adequacy ratios as a 
‘buffer’ against credit crunch. Moreover, it includes the ‘Volcker Rule’ that prohibits 
                                                          
2To mention but a few events, JPMorgan acquired Bear Stearns with the financial aid of the Federal 
Reserve Bank, Bank of America merged with Merrill Lynch, while another prominent investment bank, 
Lehman Brothers, filed for bankruptcy. 
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‘a banking entity to i) engage in proprietary trading; or ii) acquire or retain any equity, 
partnership, or other ownership interest in or sponsor a hedge fund or a private equity 
fund’ (Dodd-Frank Act, 2010). The Rule consequently aims to separate commercial 
banking from investment banking that is particularly comprised of proprietary trading. 
Moreover, the impact of the ‘Volcker Rule’ implementation is not limited within the 
US as it also applies to the US subsidiaries of foreign banks.3     
 
Despite the importance of the investment banking for the G7 and Switzerland, existing 
research on investment bank performance determinants is limited, while there is no 
study that includes the years of the financial crisis. Radic et al. (2012) is the only study 
to focus exclusively on the performance of investment banks but they cover just the 
pre-crisis period (2001-2007). The authors estimate profit and cost functions with 
investment banking fees as output, concluding that insolvency risk has a positive effect 
on cost inefficiency. Earlier studies, such as those by Allen and Rai (1996) and Vander 
(2002), examine the performance of universal banks that include investment banking 
activities. In particular, Allen and Rai (1996) review the efficiency of universal banks 
compared with conventional banks using both parametric and non-parametric methods. 
They find that universal banks operate more efficiently than traditional banks. The 
results of Vander (2002) back this finding of Allen and Rai (1996). A later study by 
Beccalli (2004) focuses on the performance of non-bank investment firms that engage 
solely in investment banking activities. Beccalli (2004) performs a comparison study 
between the UK and Italian investment firms over the 1995 to 1998 period. The author 
finds that the UK investment firms are more efficient than Italian firms.   
Against this background, an examination of the performance determinants of 
investment banks for a period that includes the financial crisis could be of interest to 
both bankers and regulators. In this paper we focus on fees, risk and liquidity as drivers 
of the performance of these institutions. We give emphasis to fees because investment 
                                                          
3The Rule has given rise to concerns due to its extraterritorial effect on the activity of the non-US banking 
institutions (Baxter, 2012). Despite the initial opposition of many countries to the formal application of 
the Rule, countries such as Germany and the UK acknowledge that regulatory amendments should be 
employed, aiming to rationalize banks’ operations in both commercial and investment banking activities. 
In particular, the UK, France and Germany have been seriously considering the introduction of a 
regulatory reform similar to the ‘Volcker Rule’ (Liikanen, 2012; Vickers and Lagarde, 2013; Gambacorta 
and Van Rixtel, 2013). The widespread criticism of the Rule is further bolstered by the proposition that 
only US banks should have the right to trade US government bonds. Banks in counties such as Canada, 
Japan and the UK issue substantial levels of foreign sovereign debt and their exemption from the US 
government debt market could harm their financial markets. 
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banks, as opposed to conventional banks, engage primarily on non-interest income 
operations (Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 2010). This concentration on fee-based 
operations could increase the risk of investment banks because of the high volatility of 
earnings stemming from non-interest income operations (Stiroh, 2004 Demirguc-Kunt 
and Huizinga, 2010). On the contrary, conventional banks can exploit risk 
diversification benefits (De-Young and Rice, 2004; Chiorazzo et al., 2008). Thus, 
investigating the impact of default risk on investment bank performance is of vital 
importance in the context of this study. In addition, investment banks carry higher 
liquidity risk than commercial banks, as the latter, in case of a financial shock, can 
count on deposits (Gatev and Strahan, 2006; Gatev et al., 2009). Hence, the level of 
liquid assets availability could form another important contributing factor to the 
performance of investment banks, particularly at a period of high liquidity constraints. 
This paper contributes to the banking literature in several ways.  Firstly, this is the only 
study on investment bank performance that covers a period (1997-2010) that includes 
the crisis years.  To this end, we employ SFA to estimate cost efficiency as a measure 
of performance of investment banks in the G7 and Switzerland.  The next and main 
contribution of this paper is the application of the dynamic panel threshold model by 
Kremer et al. (2013) in a second stage analysis. The advantage of this methodology is 
in allowing the data itself to reveal when the financial crisis occurs. This is achieved 
through testing for threshold effects of major bank determinants with respect to cost 
performance. In particular, we investigate the existence of thresholds in three bank-
specific variables: a) we use Z-Score to measure default risk, as investment bank 
activities are related to high risk b) liquidity as a key factor that affects the performance 
of financial institutions. We account for the distinction between investment banks that 
are part of larger entities and stand-alone banks, as the former are able to draw liquidity 
from their group; c) we employ investment banking fees, which is the main income 
source of investment banks. Lastly, we extend the literature concerning investment 
bank performance determinants by including in fixed effects and dynamic panel models 
crisis related variables that capture the asset bubble burst and policy responses such as 
the quantitative easing. 4     
                                                          
4The 2007 turmoil led to the implementation of unconventional monetary policies, such as quantitative 
easing (Q/E),  by the central banks of the G7 and Switzerland (Klyuev, 2009; Fratzscher et al., 2013). 
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Our threshold results show that there is a strong positive effect of Z-Score on efficiency, 
particularly for banks in the low default risk regime. We also find liquidity to have a 
negative impact on cost performance for investment banks below a threshold value. 
This effect is mainly driven by banks that are not part of a larger banking entity. 
Moreover, a higher fee-income ratio has a stronger positive impact on efficiency for 
investment banks that earn lower fees than for banks with higher levels of non-interest 
income. Interestingly, we find significant changes in the number of banks that belong 
to each threshold regime before and during the financial crisis. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 develops our hypotheses. 
Section 3 describes the SFA and the dynamic panel threshold methodology. Section 4 
discusses the investment banking industry in the G7 and Switzerland and presents our 
data and variables. Section 5 discusses our results and Section 6 concludes. 
2. Hypotheses Development 
The operations of investment banks go far beyond the lending activities of traditional 
banks as they act as direct intermediaries between investors and capital acquirers in the 
capital markets. Furthermore, they are active participants in the capital markets by 
trading securities. An important function of investment banks that differentiates them 
from traditional banks is their advisory role concerning the wealth of acquirers and 
bidders. Investment banks assess the assets of target companies and advise acquirers to 
take the most value enhancing decisions with the aim of creating substantial synergies 
(Bao and Edmans, 2011). However, the type, the complex nature and the magnitude of 
investment banking operations carries significant risks that can be transferred to their 
shareholders and customers. To illustrate this, Fernando et al. (2012) demonstrate that 
companies with Lehman Brothers as their lead equity underwriter suffered 
economically, experiencing significant reductions in their returns. Hence, it becomes 
vital to test the following hypotheses regarding the impact of default risk, liquidity and 
investment banking fees on the performance of these institutions. 
 
Investment banks are exposed to high risk due to the complexity of their operations. 
Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2010) argue that higher fee-income for investment 
banks are linked to a higher volatility of earnings and higher risk as a consequence. 
However, Chiorazzo et al. (2008) find that for German saving banks an increase in their 
fee-income generated from investment banking activity has a positive impact on the 
efficiency of saving banks. The reason being that these banks benefit from the 
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diversification of their activities as they are involved in both interest and non-interest 
income operations (De-Young and Rice, 2004). Similarly, Merciera et al. (2007) show 
that small European banks and US financial holding companies present low revenue 
volatility due to their focus on deposit-taking activities, while the shift from interest to 
non-interest income would result in a trade-off between risk and return. Based on 
previous studies (see Merciera et al., 2007; Chiorazzo et al., 2008; Demirguc-Kunt and 
Huizinga, 2010) investment banks might carry more risk due to their engagement in 
non-interest income activities than savings and commercial banks. To this end, it is vital 
to examine the impact of risk on investment bank performance.  
 
The ‘bad luck hypothesis’ states that a negative relationship exists between risk and 
performance (see Berger and De-Young, 1997). If an unexpected event leads to higher 
risk, banks react by spending more resources to manage this risk. As a consequence, 
this procedure can lead to an increase in bank costs. Consistent with the ‘bad luck 
hypothesis’, Wheelock and Wilson (2000) find that inefficient banks are closer to 
failure. Similarly, investment banks’ performance (measured by cost efficiency) is 
negatively associated with insolvency risk as defined by the Z-Score (Radic et al., 2012).  
 
Consequently, it would seem that investment banks with lower default risk are more 
efficient than banks with higher default risk. Interestingly, banks with high default risk 
aiming to decrease their probability of default, are forced to divert more resources to 
short-term screening and monitoring operations and could in fact become less efficient 
this way. Thus, our first hypothesis is as follows: 
 
H1: Lower default risk asserts a positive impact on performance of investment banks. 
 
Furthermore, investment banks, due to the absence of a deposit base, face  higher 
liquidity risk in comparison with commercial banks (Gatev and Strahan, 2006; Gatev 
et al., 2009). Brunnermeir (2009) demonstrates that investment banks’ reliance on 
short-term debt, such as repurchase agreements, could escalate their liquidity risk. 
Similarly, other studies (Adrian and Shin, 2008, 2009; Krishnamurthy, 2009; 
Brunnermeir and Pederson, 2009) argue that investment banks face more difficulties to 
raise capital during periods of financial distress than deposit-taking banks. In light of 
this, an investigation of the relationship between liquidity and investment bank 
performance would be warranted. 
Moreover, banks with higher levels of liquidity might undertake less risk in a case of 
an unexpected financial shock than banks with lower levels of liquidity. There are 
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numerous studies that examine the impact of liquidity on bank performance (Altunbas 
et al., 2000; Brissimis et al., 2008; Altunbas and Marques, 2008). Many studies find a 
direct positive relationship between a bank’s liquidity ratio and its performance (Bourke, 
1989; Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 1999; Athanasoglou et al., 2008). Nonetheless, 
there are counterarguments: excess liquidity is accompanied by high storage costs 
(Kwan, 2003; Staikouras et al., 2008) and lower returns (Pasiouras and Kosmidou, 
2007), suggesting that while liquid assets could decrease liquidity risk they could carry 
high costs that negatively affect bank performance.  
 
We assume that banks with higher liquidity perform better than banks with lower levels 
of liquid assets. By this logic (‘bad luck hypothesis’ by Berger and De-Young, 1997), 
banks with lower liquidity would underperform banks with more liquid assets while 
trying to raise their liquidity levels. Hence, our second hypothesis is as follows: 
 
H2: Higher liquidity asserts a positive impact on performance of investment banks. 
 
Rau (2000) casts the reputation effect of investment banks as the ‘superior deal 
hypothesis’. He suggests that the amount of investment banking fees is an accurate 
reflection of an investment bank’s quality. Investors are willing to pay higher fees to 
more reputable investment banks than to less reputable ones (Beatty and Welch, 1996; 
Hunter and Jagtiani, 2003; Fang, 2005; Ismail, 2008).  
On the other hand, Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2010) find that for banks earning 
high levels of non-interest income, to raise fee-income (such as investment banking 
fees) would induce higher risk. Thus, the positive effect of raising fee-income on bank 
performance via risk diversification would be stronger for banks with low levels of non-
interest income. Moreover, De-Young and Roland (2001) argue that the substitution of 
traditional operations with fee-income activities is related to an instability of earnings, 
while Acharya et al. (2006) show that banks with higher inclusion of non-interest 
income activities in their portfolio perform less efficiently than banks with lower 
involvement in fee-income operations. In the same manner, Stiroh (2004) and Lepetit 
et al. (2008) find a positive association between fee-based revenue and bank risk. Yet 
for saving banks an increase in fee-income could have a positive impact on performance 
(Chiorazzo et al., 2008), as these banks engage in both interest and non-interest income 
operations and thereby diversify their risk (De-Young and Rice, 2004). On the contrary, 
investment banks since they solely focus on investment banking activities could benefit 
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less from risk diversification compared to saving banks.  It is clearly of interest to study 
the impact of fee-income on investment bank performance. 
It follows that we should expect the scope to increase fee-income, without increasing 
risk, is higher for investment banks that earn relatively low levels of fee-income (i.e. 
less reputable banks). Therefore, our third hypothesis is as follows: 
H3: Less reputable investment banks, here considered as banks that earn relatively low 
levels of investment banking fees, could benefit more from an increase in fees  than 
would more reputable banks that earn higher levels of fee-income. 
      
  3. Methodology 
             3.1 Measuring Cost Efficiency 
In this study we measure bank performance in terms of cost efficiency by employing 
Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA). The advantage of this parametric methodology is 
that both random error and inefficiency are combined in a composite error term (Berger 
and Humphrey, 1997). More specifically, we use the following specification for the 
cost frontier: 
     𝑇𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 𝑓(𝑃𝑖𝑡, 𝑌𝑖𝑡 , 𝑁𝑖𝑡, 𝑍𝑖𝑡) + 𝑣𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡                                                                                  (1),            
where 𝑇𝐶𝑖𝑡 is the total cost for bank i in year t. Total cost is defined as the sum of 
personnel, interest and non-interest expenses.  𝑃𝑖𝑡 is a vector of input prices,  𝑌𝑖𝑡 is a 
vector of outputs, 𝑁𝑖𝑡 is a vector of fixed netputs and 𝑍𝑖𝑡   is a vector of control variables. 
We use country dummy variables to control for home country characteristics 5 and a 
dummy variable for listed banks. The term vi,t stands for the error term, while ui,t  
denotes bank’s inefficiency.   
The translog cost function, opted in the paper, takes the form: 
𝑙𝑛𝐶𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + ∑ 𝛼𝑖𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑖,𝑡 +
1
2⁄ ∑ ∑ 𝛼𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑖,𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑗,𝑡 +
1
2⁄ ∑ ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑖,𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑗,𝑡 +𝑗𝑖𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑖 + ∑ ∑ 𝛿𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑖,𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑗,𝑡 +𝑗𝑖
∑ 𝜁𝑖𝑙𝑛𝑁𝑖,𝑡 +
1
2⁄ ∑ ∑ 𝜁𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑛𝑁𝑖,𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑁𝑗,𝑡 +
1
2⁄ ∑ ∑ 𝜃𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑖,𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑁𝑗,𝑡 +𝑗𝑖𝑗𝑖𝑖 + ∑ ∑ 𝜅𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑖,𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑁𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜇1𝑡 +
1
2⁄ 𝜇2𝑡
2 +𝑗𝑖
∑ 𝜈𝑖𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑖,𝑡𝑖 + ∑ 𝜉𝑖𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑖,𝑡 + ∑ 𝜌𝑖𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑁𝑖,𝑡 +𝑖𝑖 + ∑ 𝜑𝑖𝑍𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡 ± 𝑣𝑖,𝑡𝜄         
(2)    
                                                          
5Structural and macroeconomic conditions might create variances in efficiency from country-to-country 
and time-to-time. To control for these differences we employ both time effects and country effects in the 
estimation of the efficiency as in Bonin et al. (2005). 
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Standard linear homogeneity and symmetry restrictions are applied. The equation (2) 
is estimated via a maximum likelihood procedure parameterized in terms of the 
variance parameters:  
𝜎𝜀
2 = 𝜎𝑢
2 + 𝜎𝑣
2  
                                                      and 𝛽 = 𝜎𝑢2 𝜎𝜀2⁄                                                        
(3)  
We estimate bank-specific efficiency scores using the distribution of the efficiency term 
conditional to the estimate of the composite error term, as in Jondrow et al. (1982). 
 
3.2 Dynamic Panel Threshold Model 
 
We choose to implement this methodology as it enables us to identify regime changes 
of important determinants of investment bank performance as measured by cost 
efficiency. Specifically, we employ the model of Kremer et al. (2013), which is an 
extension of Hansen (1999) model. It is based on the cross sectional threshold model 
of Caner and Hansen (2004), where GMM estimators are used to allow for endogeneity. 
However, Kremer et al. (2013) opt for a dynamic unbalanced threshold model, which 
could identify possible coefficient changes on the independent variables of our interest. 
The threshold model takes the following form: 
𝑒𝑓𝑓
𝑖𝑡
= 𝜇
𝑖
+ 𝜆1𝑚𝑖𝑡 𝐼(𝑞𝑖𝑡 ≤ 𝛾) + 𝛿1𝛪(𝑞𝑖𝑡 ≤ 𝛾) + 𝜆2𝑚𝑖𝑡 𝐼(𝑞𝑖𝑡 > 𝛾) + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                             (4)        
 
where 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑡 is the dependent variable (efficiency scores derived from SFA),  𝜇𝑖 is the 
bank-specific fixed effect, while 𝜆1 and  𝜆2  are the two reverse regression slopes 
assuming that there are two regimes. The threshold variable is  𝑞𝑖𝑡, whereas γ is the 
threshold value which categorizes the observations above (high regime) and below the 
threshold value (low regime). 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the error term. I is the indicator function signifying 
the regime indicated by the threshold variable qit and the threshold value γ.  This model 
by Kremer et al. (2013) treats  𝑚𝑖𝑡 as a vector of explanatory variables, which includes 
one regressor that is correlated with the error term and other regressors, which are not. 
Moreover, Kremer et al. (2013) extends Hansen’s (1999) specification by the regime 
dependent intercept,  𝛿1 . According to Bick (2007), ignoring the regime intercepts 
would result in inconsistent estimates for both the threshold value and the coefficient 
magnitude of the regimes. 
In order to circumvent serial correlation in the transformed error terms, Kremer et al. 
(2013) opt for the GMM estimation method (Arellano and Bover, 1995).  To obtain its 
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predicted values, Kremer et al. (2013), like Caner and Hansen (2004), estimate a 
reduced type regression for the endogenous variable as a function of instruments. In the 
first step, the predicted values replace the endogenous variable in the equation (4). In 
step two, equation (4) is estimated via ordinary least squares for a fixed threshold value 
where the threshold variable is replaced by its predicted values obtained in the first step. 
The optimal threshold value is derived from the minimization of the concentrated sum 
of squared errors (Chan, 1993; Hansen, 1997). The 95% confidence interval of the 
threshold value is given by 𝛤 = {𝛾: 𝐿𝑅(𝛾) ≤ 𝐶(𝑎)}, where 𝐶(𝑎)   represents the 
asymptotic distribution of the Likelihood Ratio (LR) statistic at the 95% level (Hansen, 
1999; Caner and Hansen, 2004). The above likelihood ratio has been adjusted to control 
for the number of time periods used for each cross section (Hansen, 1999). After the 
threshold value has been estimated, the slope coefficients λ1 and λ2 could 
be determined by the GMM estimator (Caner and Hansen, 2004). 
4. Investment banking in the G7 and Switzerland and Data/Variables  
             4.1 Investment banking in the G7 and Switzerland 
Investment banking industry in the G7 and Switzerland demonstrated strong growth for 
the most part of the last decade and reached its peak in 2006. Due to the financial crisis 
investment banking activities were substantially subdued in 2008. This slowdown has 
been reversed during recent years and the investment banking continues to form an 
important part of the financial markets in industrialised economies.6 
In North America, the US investment banks generated 58% of the global investment 
banking revenues in 2012, while 30% of US banking industry profits were from 
investment banking operations in the same year (Thomson Reuters, 2013). As a part of 
North America, Canadian banks facilitated the access of domestic issuers into foreign 
capital, resulting in a rapid growth of cross-border M&A operations.   
In  Europe,  the UK, as one of the leading financial markets, constitutes an important 
hub for international investment banking activities carried out by numerous foreign 
banks from Italy, Germany, the US, Switzerland and Japan (Burgess, 2011). 
Switzerland is another important financial centre. A large part (13% ) of the income of 
                                                          
6Among the top fee-generating investment banks worldwide are: JPMorgan, Goldman Sachs and Bank 
of America Merrill Lynch in the US; Barclays in the UK; Deutsche Bank in Germany; BNP Paribas in 
France; Mediobanca and Banca IMI in Italy; Credit Suisse and UBS in Switzerland; RBC Capital 
Markets in Canada; and Nomura in Japan (Thomson, 2013). 
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Swiss banks was generated from M&A activity in 2010 (Swiss Bankers Association 
and Boston Consulting Group, 2011). In the German banking system universal banks 
perform both commercial and investment banking operations. International investment 
banking in Germany, in particular the M&A, has developed substantially following the 
Tax Reduction Act in 2000 (Schroder et al., 2012). French investment banks primarily 
engage in market-based activities, such as trading of securities, and have a relatively 
lower number of investors than UK and German banks, which also involve off-balance 
sheet activities (Vinals and Moghadam, 2012). Banks in Italy play a more predominant 
role in financing firms than those in Germany, France and the UK (Caselli et al., 2013).  
In Japan, which is the only Asian country in the G7, the operational framework of 
investment banks has been strengthened since 2001. During this period, banks in Japan 
adopted most of the operations that typical investment banks should cover. Moreover, 
following the legislation of 2007, foreigners were able to acquire Japanese firms by 
using their own stock (Stowell, 2012) enabling a higher level of M&A activity. 
In all countries considered, the investment banking has largely grew for the greater part 
of the last decade, as evident in the market capitalization data (see Figure 1). Market 
capitalization represents the equity aspect of financing and constitutes a major function 
of investment banks in the primary market. Figure 1 shows the domestic market 
capitalization in the G7 and Switzerland for the period 2000-2010 (as % of GDP). We 
observe that market capitalization peaks in 2000 and 2007, which would suggest 
thriving periods for stock prices before the technology bubble burst in 2001 and the 
financial crisis in the end of 2007.  
  [INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
Figure 2 shows M&A activity of firms operating in the G7 and Switzerland over 2000-
2010. M&A activity constitutes the main source of fee-income for investment banks 
(Kolasinski and Kothari, 2008). It is of note that during periods of financial stability 
(2004-2007) M&A transactions increased, while they declined during times of 
economic recession (2001-2003 and 2008-2009). The G7 and Switzerland reached a 
total transaction value of 3.48 (US$tr) for M&A in 2000, which was to decrease sharply 
to 1.14 (US$tr) in 2003. From this low level of M&A activity, transaction value grew 
considerably to a total 3.58 (US$tr) in 2007 while decreased significantly to 1.53(US$tr) 
in 2010. 
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  [INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
   
   4.2 Data and Variables 
 
We use financial data from the Fitch IBCA's Bankscope database over the period 1997-
2010. Our sample includes 97 investment banks and a total of 707 observations for the 
following countries: the US, the UK, Italy, Germany, Canada, Japan, France and 
Switzerland. Out of these 97 investment banks, 66 belong to a banking group while the 
rest (33) are stand-alone investment banks.7 
 
We follow Sealey and Lindley (1977) in employing the ‘intermediation’ approach to 
identify bank inputs and outputs. This approach assumes that the core function of banks 
is to use labour and capital in order to collect funds and transform them into loans and 
other earning assets. As inputs we use labour and physical capital.  The price of labour 
is measured as the ratio of personnel expenses to total assets while the price of physical 
capital as the ratio of operating expenses to fixed assets. As output we employ other 
earning assets including loans, deposits from banks and credit institutions, government 
securities, and derivatives among others. Given that we are dealing with investment 
banks we opt for investment banking fees as an additional output (Radic et al., 2012). 
Investment banking fees comprise a wide range of operations including trading gains, 
net commission and other fees. Fixed netputs include the total level of equity and of 
fixed assets. By including equity we correct for biases in our efficiency scores, as banks 
with high levels of equity are more likely to adopt risk adverse strategies to protect 
shareholders’ wealth than banks with lower levels of equity (Berger and Mester, 1997). 
To be consistent with the literature we also include the levels of fixed assets for each 
bank as a proxy for physical capital (Berger and Mester, 1997). We also include the 
following control variables: country dummies 8  to count for time-invariant home 
country characteristics and a dummy for listed banks. Table 1 presents descriptive 
statistics of cost function variables. The main impression emerging from this table is 
similar with that which has been previously observed (Radic et al., 2012). 
  [INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
To test for the ‘bad luck hypothesis’ (H1) that a decrease default risk asserts a positive 
impact on investment banking performance, we employ Z-Score as a measure of risk. 
                                                          
7We thank the anonymous referee for pointing out this distinction. Subsidiary banks as a part of a larger 
banking entity could benefit from liquidity injections from the parent bank (Mayer and Carlyn, 2008). 
8As it is expected one dummy variable (Japan) is dropped from the sample to avoid multicollinearity 
issues.   
13 
 
We compute Z-Score as in Boyd and Graham (1986) by using the following formula: 
Z-Score= (1+ ROE)/Standard Deviation of ROE. The Z-Score has been used widely in 
recent banking studies (Lepetit et al., 2008; Barry et al., 2011; Radic et al., 2012). Banks 
with lower Z-Score have higher risk to default than banks with higher Z-Score. We also 
test the ‘bad luck hypothesis’ (H2) whereby an increase in liquidity asserts a positive 
impact on investment banking performance. Liquidity is defined for each bank as the 
ratio of liquid assets to total assets. This specification has been employed extensively 
in the literature (Altunbas et al., 2000; Kwan, 2003; Altunbas and Marques, 2008). 
Liquid assets include trading assets, loans and advances with less than three months’ 
maturity. Lower values of this ratio suggest that banks face more liquidity risk than 
banks with higher liquidity ratio. In addition, we use an income-associated ratio to test 
for the third hypothesis (H3) whereby less reputable investment banks, defined as banks 
that earn relatively low levels of investment banking fees, would benefit more by an 
increase in fees than more reputable banks (institutions that earn high levels of fee-
income). This ratio is defined as the sum of net commission, fees and net trading income 
over total assets. The conventional ratio of net income to total assets in the literature 
(Morgan and Stiroh, 2001; Bonin et al., 2005; Beccalli, 2007; Micco et al., 2007; Lin 
and Zhang, 2009) is replaced by the ratio of investment banking fees to total assets. 
This transformation reflects the core revenue of investment banks that stems from non-
traditional banking activities. 
In terms of bank-specific characteristics, we opt for a number of additional variables 
such as the ratio of equity to total assets as a proxy of capital (Athanasoglou et al., 2008; 
Lepetit et al., 2008). We also use the ratio of securities to total assets as in Radic et al. 
(2012) to account for the varieties of investment banking operations concerning equity 
issuance and underwriting activities. Finally, we examine the impact of income 
diversification on bank performance as has been used in recent studies (Laeven and 
Levine, 2007; Fiordelisi and Molyneux, 2010).9 
In terms of country macroeconomic variables, we use GDP per capita as a wealth 
measure (Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas, 2000; Maudos and Guevara, 2007; Maudos and 
Solis, 2009; Fiordelisi et al., 2011). Empirical evidence and theory point in different 
directions concerning the impact of GDP per capita on bank performance. An increase 
                                                          
9Income diversification= (1- |Net Interest Income-Other Operating Income|)/Total Operating Income.  
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of GDP per capita could result in the decline of banking costs as banks in more 
prosperous countries could benefit from access to new technologies (Lensink et al., 
2008). On the other hand, an increase of GDP per capita could increase banking costs 
due to higher operating expenses to supply a given level of services (Dietsch and 
Lozano-Vivas, 2000). 
To account for financial development, we include domestic credit to the private sector 
(DCPS) as a percentage of GDP. This is a proxy of banking activity, used in numerous 
studies as an indicator of financial development (Levine, 1997; Beck et al., 2004; 
Shandre and James, 2004; Abu-Bader and Abu-Qarn, 2008). Financial development 
could have a positive impact on cost efficiency (Pasiouras, 2008; Lozano-Vivas and 
Pasiouras, 2010). However, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2002) argue that banks 
with a primary role in financing firms might undertake high loan default risk during a 
period of financial distress.  
Higher FDI inflows may denote a higher presence of foreign investment banks in a 
country. If foreign banks manage to overcome the cross-border differences, they might 
increase the efficiency of the investment banking industry of a country (Berger et al., 
2000). Higher FDI outflows suggest a high internationalisation of domestic investment 
banks. Banks that are able to expand globally have superior practices and structures. 
Consequently, higher FDI outflows can signify that the most efficient banks go abroad 
to transfer their model. Thus, we expect FDI outflows to have a negative impact on 
efficiency (Beccalli, 2004). 
Moreover, we include the real effective exchange rate to control for exchange rate risk 
that investment banks could face due to foreign currency activities. The impact of the 
exchange rate on bank performance is subject to the net asset position of a bank in 
foreign currencies. A depreciation (appreciation) of the national currency with respect 
to a specific foreign currency, while the net asset position of a bank denominated in this 
foreign currency is positive (i.e. assets larger than liabilities), could lead to increased 
(decreased) gains for this bank (Grammatikos et al., 1986).  
 
We also use the stock and house price index of the countries considered (S&P500, 
FTSE100, DAX, CAC, FTSEMIB, SMI, SPTSX and NIKKEI), with the aim of 
capturing the asset price bubble, as in Bordo and Jeanne (2002). A recent study by 
Adrian and Song Shin (2010) shows that when the asset and stock prices rise, 
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investment banks’ leverage increases as well. Moreover, in order to control for asset 
bubble bursts, we follow Gerdesmeier et al. (2010) and adopt a composite asset price 
indicator to construct a dummy, which takes the value of 1 in case of an asset price 
burst, and 0 otherwise.10  
 
In addition, we proxy Q/E by using the reserves held by central banks for the countries 
considered, following the definition of Kobayashi et al. (2002) who suggests that Q/E 
stands for the increase in central bank reserves. A number of recent studies look at the 
impact of Q/E policy on the economies of Japan and UK (Voutsinas and Werner, 2011b; 
Lyonnet and Werner, 2012) using central bank reserves, among other tools of Q/E, and 
highlight the positive impact of this non-conventional monetary policy.11 Hence, we 
expect the impact of central bank reserves on bank performance to be positive, as in 
Kobayashi et al. (2006). 
Finally, to account for market risk we use the Volatility Implied Index (VIX). This 
financial indicator suggests that higher levels of VIX reflect higher degrees of financial 
turmoil in the US  (Whaley, 2000). It follows that we should expect the VIX impact on 
investment bank performance to be negative. Over the study period (1997-2010), we 
observe that volatility increases significantly in two instances: over 2001-2003 and 
2008-2009 (see Figure 3). Over 2004-2007 the relative market risk is lower, suggesting 
a period of financial stability. 
   [INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
                                                          
10If the composite indicator falls below a critical value the dummy takes the value of 1, and 0 otherwise. 
For the values of the composite indicator that are below the threshold value a burst exists. The critical 
value is determined as the mean of the composite indicator minus the standard deviation of the composite 
indicator times the factor μ. In our study we use μ= 0.5, similarly to the study of Gerdesmeir et al. (2010) 
where μ= 0.75. The composite indicator is estimated by the following equation: 𝐶𝐼 =
𝜑1𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 + 𝜑2ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 . 𝜑1  equals to 1, while 𝜑2  is the ratio of the standard 
deviation of the stock price index over the standard deviation of the house price index. Alternatively, 
Voutsinas and Werner (2011a) indicate the boom and the burst phase in their study based on the trend of 
lending growth rate in Japan over the 1980-1999 periods. The dummy variable equals 1 over the boom 
period (1980–1989), and 0 during the burst period (1990-1999).  
11In the study of Voutsinas and Werner (2011b) the case of Japan has been examined, as being the first 
country to implement the unconventional monetary policy of Q/E. In the early 90s Japan has experienced 
very low interest rates, triggering the implementation of new monetary policies. Similarly, Lyonnet and 
Werner (2012) look at the impact of Q/E on the nominal GDP growth for the UK. Only recently (2008), 
the Bank of England has implemented the relevant monetary policy (Joyce et al., 2011). The studies of 
Voutsinas and Werner (2011b) and Lyonnet and Werner (2012) investigate the impact of Q/E on the 
nominal GDP growth of Japan and UK respectively and conclude that credit creation, the original 
definition of Q/E (Werner, 1995), could form a stable relationship between a lending aggregate for GDP 
transactions and nominal GDP growth.   
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Table 2 shows further descriptive statistics of the bank-specific and country-level 
variables used in the fixed effect and dynamic panel regressions.  
   [INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
Note that UK and US investment banks have lower default risk (the highest two Z-
Scores of 2.346 and 2.262). French and Japanese investment banks have the highest 
default risk with Z-Scores of 1.282 and 0.656. US investment banks have the highest 
level of investment banking fees over total assets. In terms of the liquidity ratio, 
Switzerland, Canada and Japan have the highest ratios, while Germany and Italy have 
the lowest. 
 
 5.  Results and Discussion 
     5.1 Cost Efficiency Estimations 
Table 3 shows the mean cost efficiency scores. Our mean efficiency scores rank Japan, 
Switzerland and Germany in the first three places. Our findings are broadly in line with 
Radic et al. (2012) who find that Japan and Switzerland rank in the second and third 
place. However, unlike in the present study, they find that US investment banks are the 
most cost efficient among the considered countries (G7 and Switzerland). Their study 
focuses on the pre-crisis period (2001-2007) and so misses the post financial turmoil 
period where the US investment banking industry confronted severe losses.  
   [INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE]  
In Figure 4, we report changes in the mean efficiency score over time. We observe a 
downward trend from 2004 to 2008. In 2003, the average efficiency score is 75.93%. It 
decreases to 72.26% in 2005, 66.60% in 2007 and 65.68% in 2008. It would appear that 
performance was affected adversely by the financial crisis of the 2007-2009 period. 
  [INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
           5.2 Panel Estimations 
                 5.2.1 The Impact of the Z-core, Liquidity and Investment banking fees  
Tables 4 and 5 present the results for the fixed effect and dynamic panel regressions, 
where bank performance is a function of bank-specific and country-level variables. In 
the dynamic panel analysis we employ the two-step system GMM estimator of Arellano 
and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) with Windmeijer (2005) corrected 
(robust) standard errors. The two main characteristics of this estimator is that it follows 
the moments conditions on the level equations and uses the orthogonality conditions 
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introduced by the Arellano and Bond (1991) model. This method serves as a control for 
possible biases brought by country specific effects and endogeneity issues.12 
  [INSERT TABLE 4 and 5 ABOUT HERE] 
Consistent with Radic et al. (2012) and Berger and De-Young (1997), the fixed effect 
results reveal a positive relationship between the Z-Score and bank performance at the 
5% level of significance (Model 1 in Table 4). This finding remains robust when we 
control for the rest variables of our main interest (Model 4 in Table 4), which are the 
liquidity ratio and investment banking fees. Similarly, the dynamic panel analysis 
shows that the Z-Score exerts a positive impact at the 5% level of significance on cost 
efficiency (Model 1 and 2 in Table 5). These results lend support to our first hypothesis 
(H1), the ‘bad luck hypothesis’. Moreover, the fixed-effect regressions indicate a 
positive effect of investment banking fees over total assets ratio on cost efficiency at 
the 10% level of significance (Model 4 in Table 4). Dynamic panel results provide 
additional evidence of the positive relationship between fee-based income and cost 
performance (Model 2 and 4 in Table 5). This implies that banks with higher amounts 
of net income are more efficient (Bonin et al., 2005; Beccalli, 2007; Micco et al., 2007; 
Lin and Yzhang, 2009). We also find a positive association between the liquidity ratio 
and cost performance at the 5% level of significance (Model 4 in Table 4) in the fixed 
effect model. While the dynamic panel analysis indicates that the liquidity ratio has a 
positive impact on bank performance, the result is not robust (Model 3 and 4 in Table 
5). It appears that the results would confirm our second hypothesis (H2) and previous 
empirical work suggesting a positive relationship between liquidity and bank 
performance (Bourke, 1989; Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 1999; Athanasoglou et al., 
2008). 
                                                          
12Here, we employ as endogenous explanatory variables the lagged efficiency score, Z-Score, liquidity 
and fee-income ratios. According to Athanasoglou et al. (2008) in order to test the endogeneity of the 
variables we run the model twice. The first time we treated the three variables, Z-Score, liquidity and 
fee-income ratios, as investment banks’ endogenous variables, while all the other determinants as strictly 
exogenous. The second model treated all the variables as exogenous. The results support the hypothesis 
that bank specific-variables are better modelled as endogenous and country-level as exogenous (in 
accordance with Delis, 2012), because the Sargan test has 1.00 p-value. This suggests that the instruments 
are acceptable. On the other hand, in the case where all variables are treated as exogenous the p-value of 
the Sargan test is 0.003. For the GMM estimation we use Roodman (2006)  ‘xtabond 2’ specification in 
Stata. 
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The findings above show that risk, estimated as the Z-Score, liquidity and fee-income 
ratios are significant determinants of investment banking performance over the 1997-
2010 period. We go a step further in the next section (5.3) and employ the flexible 
approach of the dynamic panel threshold model (Kremer et al., 2013) to identify 
thresholds in these three variables with respect to cost efficiency and different 
underlying regimes over the crisis period. This is essential due to both the inherent 
volatility of non-interest income (De-Young and Roland, 2001) which can rise in crisis 
periods and also because of the importance of default risk and the low availability of 
liquidity during recessions. 
                5.2.2 Impact of the Control Variables 
Concerning other bank-specific variables, we find that the ratio of equity to total assets 
has a significantly positive impact on cost efficiency at the 5% level in the fixed effect 
model (Model 1 in Table 4) and at the 10% level of significance in the dynamic 
specifications (Models 2, 3 and 4 in Table 4). These results indicate that more 
capitalized banks are more cost efficient as in Athanasoglou et al. (2008) and Lepetit et 
al. (2008). The securities to total assets ratio has a positive effect on performance at the 
1% level of significance both in the fixed and dynamic panel regressions (all Models in 
Table 4 and 5). This finding suggests that off-balance sheet activities may induce a 
higher risk of bank losses (Radic et al., 2012). Finally, results from fixed and dynamic 
panel regressions reveal that the income diversification variable asserts a negative 
impact on cost efficiency at the 1% level of significance (all Models in Table 4 and 5).  
Next we turn to the impact of the country-level control variables on cost efficiency. An 
important finding relates to the policy measure of Q/E that has been implemented by 
many countries in order to weather the financial crisis. In particular, we find central 
bank reserves, a proxy of Q/E, to have a positive and significant relationship with cost 
efficiency in both fixed effect and dynamic panel regressions (all Models in Table 4 
and 5). This result would suggest that in countries where the Q/E has been broadly 
implemented, investment banks perform better than in countries where the Q/E has been 
applied at a lower level. This finding is consistent with recent studies that provide 
evidence of a positive impact of Q/E on economic outcomes (Voutsinas and Werner, 
2011b; Lyonnet and Werner, 2012) and justifies, from an investment banking 
perspective, the use of such unconventional monetary policies. The countries of our 
sample that have implemented Q/E at a large scale are Japan, the UK and the US. The 
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Bank of Japan is the first to follow this policy (Lyonnet and Werner, 2012). 
Furthermore, in response to the intensification of the financial crisis, the Bank of 
England implemented Q/E in the form of asset purchases backed by the central bank 
(Joyce et al., 2011). Similarly, the Federal Reserve launched a new set of non-
conventional monetary ‘tools’, termed as ‘crediting easing’, in order to rise the liquidity 
of the markets after the collapse of Lehman Brothers. The rest of the economies in our 
sample, the ones belonging to the Eurozone area, also engaged in Q/E but at a lower 
extent in comparison with the large asset purchases in the US and the UK (Martin and 
Milas, 2012; Reichlin, 2013). 
Our fixed and dynamic panel analysis reveals that both the house price and the stock 
price index have a negative and significant impact on cost efficiency.13 As expected, a 
bubble burst has a negative impact on investment bank performance due to decreased 
investment activity (Allen and Carletti, 2010).14 We also find a strong negative effect 
of the VIX indicator on bank performance at the 1% level of significance (all Models 
in Table 4) in line with previous studies (Bourke 1989; Miller and Noulas, 1997). 
Moreover, GDP per capita has a negative impact on cost efficiency, suggesting the 
higher operating and financial costs for supplying a particular level of service (Dietsch 
and Lozano-Vivas, 2000). FDI inflows have a negative impact on cost performance, in 
line with Berger et al. (2000). Similarly, FDI outflows have negative impact on bank 
performance, suggesting that most efficient banks go abroad to export their model 
(Beccalli, 2004). As for the financial development indicator, we find that the 
DCPS/GDP ratio has a statistically significant negative effect on cost efficiency, 
consistent with Demirgunt-Kunt and Maksimovic (2002). 
                                                          
13These results show that during boom periods, where a rise of asset and stock prices takes place, there 
exists a deterioration of investment bank performance. A recent study by Adrian and Song Shin (2010) 
shows that when the asset and stock prices rise, investment banks’ leverage increases as well in a pro-
cyclical manner. At low levels of leverage, any increase in leverage might moderate the conflicts between 
shareholders and managers regarding the choice of investment and the underlying risk (Myers, 1977). 
This is so because managers would need cash to service the debt rather than take excessively risky 
investments (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). However, when leverage becomes relatively high, any 
increase in leverage might raise conflicts between debt holders and shareholders, mainly due to the higher 
risk of default or liquidation (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). These conflicts would escalate agency costs 
between debt holders and shareholders and this would result in higher interest expenditures to pay debt 
holders for their estimated losses. 
14The bubble-burst indicator shows that there are two major bursts that concern the majority of the sample, 
these occur in the 2001-2003 and 2008-2010 periods. For all countries in the sample we identify the 
2001-2003 burst. The latter result corresponds to the technology bubble burst in 2001, while the second 
burst (2008-2010) coincides with the recent financial flood of 2007 (Lin, 2009). 
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5.3 Threshold Estimations 
            5.3.1 Z-Score Threshold  
Our empirical estimations for threshold effects are based on an unbalanced dataset of 
707 observations including 97 banks for the period 1997-2010. Table 6 presents the 
dynamic panel threshold model with the Z-Score as threshold variable.15 
    [INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE] 
We find that the threshold value for the Z-Score variable is 1.516 (see Table 6). This 
value splits the sample into two regimes: the first regime consists of banks with a 
relatively high risk of default; the second consists of banks with lower risk. The 
coefficient λ2 = 0.044 for banks within the high regime is positive and significant at the 
5% level. This implies that a 1% decrease in Z-Score would benefit efficiency by 4.4%. 
This result is consistent with our first hypothesis (H1). A decrease in default risk for 
banks with low Z-Score, below the threshold value, is also significant at the 5% level 
and positively related to cost efficiency (λ1 = 0.012), although here at a lower magnitude 
than the one of the high regime.  
In Table 7, the percentage of investment banks classified as low-regime is consistently 
above the percentage of banks classified as high-regime with respect to the Z-Score. 
Note between 2000 and 2003 there is a clear negative trend in the number of investment 
banks with low exposure to risk (46 investment banks in 2000 decreases to 18 in 2003). 
The composite indicator of asset prices reveals the burst during 2001-2003, while the 
VIX indicator shows higher levels of risk during the same period (Figure 3). Between 
2004 and 2007, we observe a decreasing trend in the percentage of investment banks 
that have high risk exposure, when according to the VIX indicator there should be lower 
market volatility. Finally, the percentage of investment banks with low risk exposure 
(the high regime) has decreased significantly since 2008 due to the crisis. This result is 
supported by the identification of the 2008-2010 burst, when again the associated risk 
(VIX) increases considerably (Figure 3).  
  [INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE] 
                                                          
15We perform a general to the specific sensitivity analysis. In the first stage, we employ a wide range of 
instruments while in the second stage we include only one instrument. We find no significant difference 
in our results. We follow the same procedure for the liquidity and investment banking fees threshold 
analysis. The results are available on request. 
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Concerning the other bank specific variables, we find that the equity and securities to 
total assets ratios have a positive and significant relationship with cost efficiency. On 
the other hand, income diversification has a negative effect on performance. In terms 
of country-level determinants, we find that FDI inflows, house price and stock price 
index, bubble bursts and VIX indicator have a negative and significant impact on 
efficiency. Moreover, central bank reserves have a positive effect on efficiency. Overall, 
our results are similar to the fixed effect and the dynamic panel regressions. 
              5.3.2 Liquidity Threshold  
Table 8 presents the threshold effects due to liquidity measured as the ratio of liquid 
assets to total assets. 
  [INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE]    
Again we find evidence of two regimes. A liquidity threshold value of around 0.230 
splits the sample into (i) banks with low liquidity ratios (higher liquidity risk) and (ii) 
banks with high liquidity ratios (lower liquidity risk). We find a negative and significant 
(at the 5% level) relationship between liquidity and performance for banks within the 
low regime (high liquidity risk) as λ1 = -0.202. This result is consistent with the findings 
of Kwan (2003) and Staikouras et al. (2008). On the other hand, the impact of liquidity 
on bank performance for the banks in the high regime is rather inconclusive as it is not 
significant, yet it takes a positive sign as in Athanasoglou et al.  (2008). 
 
Table 9 shows the classification of banks over time based on the liquidity threshold 
value (0.23). This classification implies that there are more banks classified in the high 
liquidity regime as opposed to the low one over the whole period. This also indicates 
that the majority of investment banks fall within the category of high liquidity and hence 
carry less liquidity risk in the event of a financial shock. Nonetheless, the number of 
banks within the low regime increases from 28% in 2007 to 37% in 2009. 
  [INSERT TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE] 
For the remaining bank-specific determinants, we find that investment banking fees, 
equity and securities to total assets ratios have a highly significant and positive impact 
on cost performance (see Table 8) while the income diversification variable has a 
negative impact on efficiency at the 1% level of significance. For the country-level 
variables, we find that FDI inflows, stock price index, bubble burst and VIX indicator 
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have a strong negative impact on cost performance. Additionally, central bank reserves 
continue to have a strong positive effect on cost performance at the 1% level of 
significance.  
               5.3.3 Investment Banking Fees Threshold 
In this section, we use the ratio of investment banking fees to total assets as the 
threshold variable to test the effect of investment banking fees on cost efficiency 
performance. We present our findings in Table 10. 
  [INSERT TABLE 10 ABOUT HERE] 
The threshold value of fee-income is around 0.009. The variable splits the sample into 
two regimes. In line with Demirguc- Kunt and Huizinga (2010) we find that for banks 
with low levels of investment fees (for banks in the low regime) an increase in fees 
asserts a positive and significant (at the 5% level) impact on performance as λ2 = 0.216. 
This finding supports our third hypothesis (H3). Nonetheless, banks within the high 
regime exhibit a decrease in performance when fees increase, but in this case this effect 
is not statistically significant. 
Between 1998-2007 we observe a stable increase in the percentage of investment banks 
that belong in the low fee regime that peaks in 2008, while in 2009 and 2010 there is a 
decrease in banks that fall within this regime (see Table 11). 
   [INSERT TABLE 11 ABOUT HERE] 
Regarding the other cost efficiency correlates, we find equity to total assets to have a 
strong positive impact on cost performance. As in with our previous findings, income 
diversification has a strong negative effect on investment banking performance at the 1% 
level of significance. The relationship between FDI inflows, stock price index, bubble 
burst and VIX indicator and efficiency remains negative and significant, in line with our 
previous results. Lastly, central bank reserves stimulate the cost efficiency of investment 
banks. 
5.3.4 Does the impact of liquidity differ for investment banks as subsidiaries 
of banking groups? 
Subsidiary banks as a part of a larger banking entity can benefit from liquidity injections 
as these banks have ready access to liquidity from the parent bank (Mayer and Carlyn, 
2008). Banks that are members of a banking group can draw liquidity from the parent 
company in case of a financial shock (De Haas and van Lelyveld, 2010). We split the 
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sample between banks that are part of a banking group and those which  are not for this 
reason. Our findings are available in Tables 12 and 13. 
  [INSERT TABLE 12&13 ABOUT HERE] 
A number of previous studies have found a positive relationship between liquidity and 
bank performance (Bourke, 1989; Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 1999; Athanasoglou 
et al., 2008). Our results show that for banks as part of a banking group, an increase in 
liquidity has a positive effect on efficiency at the 10% and 5% levels of significance 
(Model 1 and 2 in Table 12). Yet an increase in liquidity for stand-alone banks has a 
negative impact on efficiency at the 10% and 5% levels of significance (Model 3 and 4 
in Table 12). The negative relationship between liquidity and bank performance is 
supported by empirical evidence (Kwan, 2003; Staikouras et al., 2008; Pasiouras and 
Kosmidou, 2007). The first result supports the ‘bad luck hypothesis’ (H2) concerning 
the positive impact of liquidity on cost efficiency. However, our findings imply that the 
impact of liquidity on performance varies and depends on whether investment bank 
could draw liquidity from a larger banking entity. Table 13 presents threshold 
estimations for stand-alone banks, revealing that an increase in liquidity for the low 
liquidity regime banks has a negative effect on investment bank performance at the 5% 
level of significance as λ= -0.086 (Model 1 in Table 13). Moreover, threshold 
estimation for subsidiary banks shows that for both the low and high regime investment 
banks there exists a negative relationship between efficiency and liquidity but the 
coefficients are not statistically different from zero (Model 2 in Table 13). The results 
for both banking groups may indicate that our significant threshold liquidity effects for 
the whole sample are driven by banks with low liquidity that are mainly banks that do 
not belong to a larger banking entity. 
 
Table 14 shows that the majority of stand-alone investment banks fall within the low 
liquidity regime. Lastly, the number of banks in the low liquidity regime decreases 
markedly (20%) from 2007 to 2008 with the burst of the financial crisis (Panel A in 
Table 14).  
   [INSERT TABLE 14 ABOUT HERE] 
 
 6. Conclusions 
 
In this paper we employ the dynamic panel threshold methodology introduced by 
Kremer et al. (2013) and find that the positive impact of Z-Score on investment bank 
performance, as measured by cost efficiency, is more pronounced for banks with lower 
risk. This result is important in the context of the investment banks whose operations 
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are inherently riskier than those of conventional banks (Bertay et al., 2013). 
Furthermore, we find that liquidity has a negative impact on cost efficiency for banks 
that belong to the low liquidity regime. This effect is driven for the most part by stand-
alone banks that could neither draw liquidity from a larger banking entity nor rely on 
deposits  as commercial banks (Gatev and Strahan, 2006; Gatev et al., 2009). The 
analysis also reveals that the fee-income ratio  has a positive impact on cost efficiency 
only for banks belonging to the low fee-income regime. This suggests that an increase 
in investment banking fees comes at the expense of increased risk for investment banks 
in the high fee-income regime. This is a major difference between investment banks 
and conventional, as for the latter a rise of the fee-income could bring diversification 
benefits (De-Young and Rice, 2004; Chiorazzo et al., 2008). 
Notably, we find important changes in the percentages of banks that fall within each 
threshold regime before and during the financial crisis. In particular, the percentage of 
banks in the regime of high default risk (low Z-Score), increases considerably in the 
2008-2010 period. This indicates that investment banks underwent a period of 
substantial financial distress. Moreover, the number of banks belonging to the low 
liquidity regime increases in the years of the crisis. This, in combination with the 
negative impact of liquidity on cost efficiency for stand-alone investment banks in the 
low liquidity regime could denote the high costs of drawing liquidity during financial 
turmoil (Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009). Finally, there is a slight increase in the 
number of banks belonging to the low fee-income regime over the crisis period. The 
positive impact of fee-income on the performance of banks in the low regime could 
suggest the importance of income generation capability in order to weather the financial 
crisis.  
Measures to strengthen bank stability are warranted. One of the regulatory gaps 
revealed by the credit crunch was the absence of strict capital adequacy ratios for 
investment banks. This became evident during the crisis period as the intensification of 
investment banking risk led to significant losses both for the financial institutions and 
the entire economy. More stringent legislation related to capital requirements such as 
the Dodd-Frank Act (2010) in the US and the Capital Requirements Directive  4 (CRD 
4) in Europe could act as defence mechanism against default risk and thus improve 
investment bank performance. In terms of liquidity, the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) 
proposed in Basel III and in CRD 4 could ensure sufficient short-term liquidity and thus 
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diminish the need of banks to seek external funding during periods of financial turmoil. 
The LCR measure could be of particular importance for stand-alone investment banks 
who cannot rely on deposit funding. 
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List of Tables 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of the variables employed in the cost frontier estimations. 
Variable Description Mean  Stand. Deviation Minimum  Maximum 
TC Total Cost 1,688 5,142 0.0019 59,100 
Y1 Total Earnings assets 71,800 224,000 0.0033 2590,000 
Y2 Investment Banking Fees 0.999 2,694 0.0001 23,700 
N1 Equity 1,698 4,354 0.0011 50,100 
N2 Assets 37,700 0,361 0.0033 3,444 
P1 Price of labour 0.776 3.222 0.0002 1.8 
P2 Price of physical capital 27.54 160.82 0.0667 2072.00 
Notes: the Table reports the variables used in the cost frontier estimation for the period 1997-2010. Total Cost (TC): personnel, interest 
and non-interest expenses; Outputs (Y1 & Y2)); Total Earning assets (loans, deposits from banks and credit institutions, government 
securities, derivatives and other earning assets) and 2) Investment Banking Fees (net fees, commission and trading income); Netputs (N1 
& N2)) Equity and 2) Total Assets; Inputs (P1 & P2)) Price of labour (personnel expenses over total assets) and 2) Price of physical capital 
(total operating expenses over fixed assets). The values of TC, N1, N2 , Y1 and Y2, are in million dollars, while P1and P2 are ratios. 
 
 
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics of bank-specific and country-level variable. 
Country N 
Z-
Score 
Invest. 
Banking 
Fees/ 
Liquid./TA E/TA 
Income 
Divers. 
Securities 
/TA 
GDP 
per 
capita 
FDI 
Inflows 
FDI 
Outflows 
House 
Price 
Index 
Stock 
Price 
Index 
Reserves 
TA 
Canada 17 2.0823 0.0342 0.523 0.0547 -0.1807 0.6517 10.1286 3.58 3.914 152.41 155.38 24.2956 
France 63 1.2827 0.0556 0.3548 0.1055 0.242 0.2039 10.027 2.733 5.249 196.15 147.60 24.3474 
Germany 122 1.9408 0.1702 0.2146 0.2709 0.4383 0.6112 10.0852 1.885 2.864 94.89 134.53 24.666 
Italy 23 1.4954 0.0167 0.306 0.0919 -0.384 0.2018 9.8863 1 2.386 194.96 122.82 24.2341 
Japan 141 0.6568 0.1131 0.4957 0.2872 0.1012 0.2755 10.5545 0.177 1.096 74.96 83.04 27.272 
Switz. 21 1.9423 0.0431 0.6277 0.0606 0.4901 0.2143 10.4944 4.689 10.384 113.66 107.11 24.6329 
UK 176 2.346 0.0695 0.3525 0.1576 0.3306 0.2644 10.2306 4.62 5.384 259.73 107.01 24.4951 
US 143 2.262 0.1954 0.3908 0.1912 0.207 0.5225 10.5004 1.666 1.867 167.98 135.83 24.964 
Total 706       
Mean   1.751 0.0872 0.4081 0.1524 0.1556 0.3682 10.2384 2.544 4.143 156.84 124.16 24.8633 
Notes: the Table reports descriptive statistics of bank-specific and most of country level variables used to perform fixed effect and dynamic panel 
regressions. N stands for the number of observations by country. As bank-specific variables we use: Z-Score= (1+ROE)/ (Standard Deviation of 
ROE); Invest. Banking Fees/TA= net fees, commission and net trading income over total assets; Liquid assets over total assets; E/TA= equity 
over total assets; Income divers.= (1- |Net Interest Income-Other Operating Income|)/Total Operating Income; Securities/TA= total securities 
over total assets.  Some of the country level independent variables that we use are: GDP per capita (natural logarithm); FDI inflows (natural 
logarithm); FDI outflows (natural logarithm); House Price Index; Stock Price Index; Reserves (natural logarithm). For bank-specific variables 
we use FITCH Bankscope database while for most country variables we use World Development indicators from World Bank. As House Price 
Index we use the index constructed by the Economist Intelligence Unit using as the base year the 1997.  For  the  Stock Price Index data we use 
Bloomberg database. 
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics of cost efficiency (1997-2010).  
Country Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Canada       0.4946 0.1690 0.1848 0.7473 
France 0.5859                0.1817 0.1543 0.8582 
Germany 0.7769 0.1320 0.1767 0.9170 
Italy 0.6547 0.1426 0.4508 0.8812 
Japan 0.9197 0.0282 0.7230 0.9559 
Switz. 0.8557 0.0893 0.6718 0.9622 
UK 0.6029 0.1658 0.2099 0.9451 
US 0.6319 0.1484 0.2247 0.8373 
Mean 0.6903 0.1321 0.1767 0.9621 
Notes: the Table reports the mean efficiencies for the G7 and Switzerland over the period 1997-2010. Efficiencies 
are derived from the Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) . 
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Table 4. Fixed effects results for Z-Score, liquidity and investment banking fees as bank cost 
efficiency determinants in the G7 and Switzerland (1997-2010). 
     
Variables Model(1) Model(2) Model(3) Model(4) 
     
Z-Score 0.008**   0.009** 
 (0.0039)   (0.0038) 
 
Investment Banking Fees/TA 
  
0.128 
(0.0885) 
 
  
0.144* 
(0.0852) 
 
Liquid assets/TA   0.048 
(0.0327) 
 
0.069** 
(0.0307) 
 
E/TA 0.119** 0.106* 0.108* 0.111* 
 (0.0586) (0.0590) (0.0595) (0.0611) 
Securities/TA 0.172*** 0.182*** 0.170*** 0.204*** 
 (0.0418) (0.0447) (0.0407) (0.0420) 
Income diversification -0.016*** -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.016*** 
 (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0019) 
GDP per capita -0.032 -0.039 0.001 -0.058 
 (0.156) (0.154) (0.155) (0.152) 
FDI inflows -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008*** 
 (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0026) (0.0026) 
FDI outflows -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003* 
 (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0018) 
DCPS/GDP -0.013 -0.012 -0.010 -0.010 
 (0.0315) (0.0315) (0.0311) (0.0319) 
Real effective exchange rate -0.000 -0.000 4.14e-05 -5.74e-05 
 (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0006) 
House Price Index -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0005* 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Stock Price Index -0.0007** -0.0006** -0.0006* -0.0006** 
 (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Burst of the asset bubble (dummy) -0.0252** -0.0239** -0.0225** -0.0245** 
 (0.0103) (0.0101) (0.0104) (0.0101) 
Reserves 0.046** 0.048** 0.044** 0.045** 
 (0.0193) (0.0189) (0.0187) (0.0183) 
Volatility Implied Index -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
 (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0005) 
Constant 0.0343 0.0293 -0.303 0.238 
 (1.529) (1.508) (1.500) (1.477) 
F-test 11.68*** 10.46*** 11.75*** 11.31*** 
Observations 706 706 706 706 
R-squared 0.185 0.190 0.183 0.206 
Number of banks 97 97 97 97 
Notes: the Table reports the regression results based on a fixed effect model over the period 1997 to 2010. The dependent 
variable is cost efficiency derived using a SFA methodology. As bank-specific independent variables we employ: Z-
Score= (1+ROE)/ (Standard Deviation of ROE); Investment Banking Fees= net fees, commission and trading income 
over total assets; Liquid assets over total assets; E/TA= equity over total assets; Income diversification= 1- |Net Interest 
Income-Other Operating Income|/Total Operating Income; Securities/TA= total securities over total assets.  As country 
variables we employ: GDP per capita; DCPS/GDP; FDI inflows; FDI outflows; Real Effective Exchange Rate; House 
price Index; Stock Price Index; Burst of the asset bubble (dummy); Reserves (natural logarithm); Volatility Implied Index. 
For bank-specific variables we use FITCH Bankscope database while for most country variables we use World 
Development indicators from World Bank. As House Price Index we use the index constructed by the Economist 
Intelligence Unit using as the base year the 1997. For Volatility Implied Index (VIX-Chicago Board Options Exchange 
Volatility Index) and Stock Price Index we use Bloomberg database. To avoid collinearity problems with the selected 
variables, we first analyze correlations of all the selected variables. We check that there is not a high level of correlation 
between the variables used in the models. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. Robust 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table 5. Dynamic panel results for Z-Score, liquidity and investment banking fees as bank 
cost efficiency determinants in the G7 and Switzerland (1997-2010). 
     
Variables Model(1) Model(2) Model(3) Model(4) 
     
Lag efficiency 0.371*** 0.459*** 0.425*** 0.278*** 
 (0.116)      (0.105) (0.104) (0.0874) 
Z-Score 0.013**   0.0152** 
 (0.0056)   (0.0069) 
Investment Banking Fees/TA  0.128**  0.116** 
  (0.0541)  (0.0489) 
Liquid assets/TA   0.0679 0.0813 
   (0.0553) (0.0605) 
E/TA -0.0765 -0.138* -0.037 0.018 
 (0.0786) (0.0714) (0.0988) (0.0807) 
Securities/TA 0.164*** 0.153*** 0.190*** 0.228*** 
 (0.0536) (0.0406) (0.0650) (0.0585) 
Income diversification -0.023*** -0.022*** -0.024*** -0.025*** 
 (0.0026) (0.0024) (0.0041) (0.0041) 
GDP per capita -0.211 -0.175 -0.240* -0.262 
 (0.180) (0.145) (0.140) (0.200) 
FDI inflows -0.006** -0.007** -0.006** -0.006** 
 (0.002) (0.0024) (0.0025) (0.0023) 
FDI outflows 0.000 -0.000 -0.002 -0.001 
 (0.00192) (0.00164) (0.00160) (0.00201) 
DCPS/GDP -0.103** -0.0732* -0.0629 -0.0828* 
 (0.0435) (0.0418) (0.0524) (0.0464) 
Real effective exchange rate 4.63e-05 0.000276 0.000547 2.90e-05 
 (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0009) 
House Price Index -0.0006** -0.0006*** -0.0005** -0.0005* 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) 
Stock Price Index -0.001** -0.001** -0.000 -0.001** 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Burst of the asset bubble (dummy) -0.016 -0.015 -0.005 -0.016 
 (0.0119) (0.0105) (0.0140) (0.0175) 
Reserves 0.042** 0.0453** 0.063*** 0.062*** 
 (0.0196) (0.0183) (0.0209) (0.0183) 
Volatility Implied Index -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 
 (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0006) 
Constant 1.859 1.272 1.387 1.796 
 (2.034) (1.700) (1.514) (1.978) 
Wald test 230.17*** 354.73*** 317.36*** 203.56*** 
Sargan (p-value) 43.5(0.19) 39.22(0.29) 38.89(0.31) 73.78(0.45) 
AR(1) -2.4202** -2.773*** -2.9819*** 2.4062*** 
AR(2) -0.9097 -1.0944 -1.044 0.9080 
Observations 
Number of instruments 
609 
45 
609 
45 
609 
45 
609 
89 
Number of banks 97 97 97 97 
Notes: the Table reports the dynamic panel regression results for the period 1997 to 2010. As bank-specific independent 
variables we employ: Z-Score= (1+ROE)/ (Standard Deviation of ROE); Investment Banking Fees=Net fees, commission and 
trading income over total assets; Liquid assets over total assets; E/TA: equity over total assets; Income diversification=1- |Net 
Interest Income-Other Operating Income|/Total Operating Income; Securities /TA=total securities over total assets.  As 
country variables we employ: GDP per capita; DCPS/GDP; FDI inflows; FDI outflows; Real Effective Exchange Rate; House 
price Index; Stock Price Index; Burst of the asset bubble (dummy); Reserves (natural logarithm); Volatility Implied Index. 
For bank-specific variables we use FITCH Bankscope database while for most country variables we use World Development 
indicators from World Bank. As House Price Index we use the index constructed by the Economist Intelligence Unit using as 
the base year the 1997. For Volatility Implied Index (Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index) and Stock Price 
Index we use Bloomberg database. To avoid collinearity problems with the selected variables, we first analyze correlations of 
all the selected variables. We check that there is not a high level of correlation between the variables used in the models. ***, 
** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. Windmeijer (2005) corrected (robust) standard errors are 
in parentheses. 
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Table 6.Results of dynamic panel threshold estimation with Z-Score as  threshold variable. 
Investment banks 
Threshold estimate 
Z-Score 1.516866 
95% confidence interval (1.318830-2.165600) 
Impact of Z-Score                                         S.E                   
λ1  0.012** 0.0058 
λ2  0.044** 0.0180 
Impact of covariates              S.E 
Investment Banking Fees/TA  0.056 0.0861 
Liquid Assets/TA  0.056 0.0372 
E/TA  0.108** 0.0403 
Securities/TA  0.190*** 0.0370 
Income diversification -0.016*** 0.0040 
GDP per capita -0.015 0.1274 
FDI inflows -0.008*** 0.0025 
FDI outflows -0.003 0.0018 
DCPS/GDP -0.001 0.0284 
Real Effective Exchange Rate  0.000 0.0006 
House Price Index -0.000** 0.0002 
Stock Price Index -0.001** 0.0002 
Burst of the asset bubble (dummy) -0.024** 0.0103 
Reserves  0.041*** 0.0132 
Volatility Implied Index -0.002*** 0.0005 
δ 0.018*** 0.0055 
Observations 609   
Low regime 372  
High regime 237   
Notes: the Table reports the estimations for the dynamic panel threshold model. Each regime has at least 5% of the 
observations (Hansen, 1999). The threshold value of Z-Score variable for banks range between 1.31883 and 
2.1656.We denote as dependent variable banks’ efficiency scores (𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑡), while as the threshold and the regime 
dependent variable we impose the (𝑍 − 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡) which represents banks’ default risk. Following Bick (2007), the 
model accounts for regime dependent intercepts (δ). We assume 𝑚𝑖𝑡 includes bank-specific and country explanatory 
variables. For bank-specific variables we use: Investment Banking Fees= net fees, commission and trading income 
over total assets; Liquid assets over total assets; Securities/TA= total securities over total assets; Income 
diversification= 1- |Net Interest Income-Other Operating Income|/Total Operating Income; E/TA= equity over total 
assets. As country variables we employ: GDP per capita; DCPS/GDP; FDI inflows; FDI outflows; Real Effective 
Exchange Rate; House price Index; Stock Price Index; Burst of the asset bubble (dummy); Reserves (natural 
logarithm); Volatility Implied Index. For bank-specific variable we use FITCH Bankscope database while for most 
country variables we use World Development indicators from World Bank. As House Price Index we use the index 
constructed by the Economist Intelligence Unit using as the base year the 1997. For Volatility Implied Index (Chicago 
Board Options Exchange Volatility Index) we use Bloomberg database. Also as endogenous variable for the model 
we impose the Investment Banking Fees, where 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑠 = 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑡−1. We check that there is not 
a high level of correlation between the variables used in the models. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% 
significance levels respectively.  
 
Table 7. Dynamic Threshold Analysis: classification of investment banks into the two 
identified regimes based on threshold value of Z-Score. 
Threshold: Z-Score                         
  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Low regime 64% 47% 53% 75% 78% 82% 62% 49% 52% 52% 54% 65% 67% 
High regime 36% 53% 47% 25% 22% 18% 38% 51% 48% 48% 46% 35% 33% 
Notes: the Table shows the classification of the investment banks based on the Z-Score threshold value that we obtained following 
Kremer’s et al. (2013) threshold model for dynamic panel. As threshold variable we use: Z-Score= (1+ROE)/ (Standard 
Diversification ROE).  
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Table 8. Results of dynamic panel threshold estimation with liquidity as threshold variable. 
Investment banks 
Threshold estimate 
Liquidity 0.229967 
95% confidence interval (0.02045-0.59454) 
Impact of  Liquid Assets/TA                                       S.E                                      
λ1 -0.202** 0.0907 
λ2 0.017 0.0313 
Impact of covariates          S.E 
Z-Score  0.005 0.0053 
Investment Banking Fees/TA  0.141*** 0.0676 
E/TA  0.113** 0.0405 
Securities/TA  0.199*** 0.0377 
Income diversification -0.017*** 0.0043 
GDP per capita -0.047 0.1237 
FDI inflows -0.008*** 0.0025 
FDI outflows -0.003* 0.0018 
DCPS/GDP -0.004 0.0290 
Real Effective Exchange Rate  0.000 0.0006 
House Price Index -0.000* 0.0002 
Stock Price Index -0.001** 0.0002 
Burst of the asset bubble (dummy) -0.024** 0.0099 
Reserves  0.045*** 0.0131 
Volatility Implied Index -0.002*** 0.0005 
δ  0.049 0.0514 
Observations 609   
Low regime 195  
High regime 414   
Notes: the Table reports the estimations for the dynamic panel threshold model. Each regime has at least 5% of the 
observations (Hansen, 1999). The liquidity threshold value ranges between 0.02045 and 0.59454. We denote as 
dependent variable banks’ efficiency scores(𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑡), while as the threshold and the regime dependent variable we 
impose the liquidity (𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡), which represents bank’s liquid assets over total assets. Following Bick (2007), the 
model accounts for regime dependent intercepts (δ).We assume 𝑚𝑖𝑡 includes bank-specific and country explanatory 
variables. For bank-specific variables we use: Z-Score= (1+ROE)/ (Standard Deviation of ROE); Investment Banking 
Fees= net fees, commission and trading income over total assets; Securities/TA= total securities over total assets; 
Income diversification= 1- |Net Interest Income-Other Operating Income|/Total Operating Income; E/TA= equity over 
total assets. As country variables we employ: GDP per capita; DCPS/GDP; FDI inflows; FDI outflows; Real Effective 
Exchange Rate; House price Index; Stock Price Index; Reserves (natural logarithm); Burst of the asset bubble (dummy); 
Volatility Implied Index . For bank-specific variables we use FITCH Bankscope database while for most country 
variables we use World Development indicators from World Bank. As House Price Index we use the index constructed 
by the Economist Intelligence Unit using as the base year the 1997. For Volatility Implied Index (VIX-Chicago Board 
Options Exchange Volatility Index) and Stock Price Index we use Bloomberg database. Also as endogenous variable 
for the model we impose Z-Score, where 𝑍 − 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 = 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑡−1. We check that there is not a high level of correlation 
between the variables used in the models. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively.
                                         
Table 9. Dynamic Threshold Analysis: classification of investment banks into the two 
identified regimes based on threshold value of Liquidity. 
Threshold: Liquidity                         
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Low regime 45% 41% 31% 21% 22% 32% 29% 38% 32% 28% 36% 37% 30% 
High regime 55% 59% 69% 79% 78% 68% 71% 63% 68% 72% 64% 63% 70% 
Notes: the Table shows the classification of the investment banks based on the liquidity threshold value that we obtained following 
Kremer’s et al. (2013) threshold model for dynamic panel. As threshold variable we use the ratio of liquid assets over total assets. 
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Table 10. Results of dynamic panel threshold estimation with investment banking fees as 
threshold variable. 
Investment banks 
Threshold estimate 
Investment banking fees 0.009322 
95% confidence interval (0.008271-0.009322) 
Impact of investment banking fees/TA                           S.E                                      
λ1 0.216** 0.0941 
λ2 -0.005 0.0633 
Impact of covariates  S.E 
Z-Score 0.007 0.0052 
Liquid Assets/TA 0.059 0.0366 
E/TA 0.117** 0.0414 
Securities/TA 0.020 0.0352 
Income diversification -0.016*** 0.0040 
GDP per capita -0.113 0.1261 
FDI inflows -0.009*** 0.0026 
FDI outflows -0.003 0.0017 
DCPS/GDP -0.027 0.0286 
Real Effective Exchange Rate 0.000 0.0006 
House Price Index 0.000 0.0002 
Stock Price Index -0.001** 0.0002 
Burst of the asset bubble (dummy) -0.026** 0.0097 
Reserves  0.046*** 0.0134 
Volatility Implied Index -0.002*** 0.0005 
δ  0.146** 0.0672 
Observations 609   
Low regime 73  
High regime 533   
Notes: the Table reports the estimations for the dynamic panel threshold model. Each regime has at least 5% of the 
observations (Hansen, 1999). The threshold value of Investment Banking Fees variable for banks range between 
0.008271 and 0.009322. We denote as dependent variable banks’ efficiency scores(𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑡), while as the threshold and 
the regime dependent variable we impose the Investment Banking Fees (𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑠 𝑖𝑡), which 
represents banks’ net fees commission and trading income over total assets.  Following Bick (2007), the model 
accounts for regime dependent intercepts (δ). We assume 𝑚𝑖𝑡  includes bank-specific and country explanatory 
variables. For bank-specific variables we use: Z-Score= (1+ROE)/ (Standard Deviation of ROE); Liquid assets over 
total assets; Securities/TA= total securities over total assets; Income diversification= 1- |Net Interest Income-Other 
Operating Income|/Total Operating Income; E/TA= equity over total assets. As country variables we employ: GDP 
per capita; DCPS/GDP; FDI inflows; FDI outflows; Real Effective Exchange Rate; House price Index; Stock Price 
Index; Burst of the asset bubble (dummy); Reserves (natural logarithm) ; Volatility Implied Index. For bank-specific 
variables we use FITCH Bankscope database while for most country variables we use World Development indicators 
from World Bank. As House Price Index we use the index constructed by the Economist Intelligence Unit using as 
the base year the 1997. For Volatility Implied Index (VIX-Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index) and 
Stock Price Index we use Bloomberg database.. Also as endogenous variable for the model we impose Z-Score, where 
𝑍 − 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 = 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑡−1. We check that there is not a high level of correlation between the variables used in the models. 
***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively.                                         
 
Table 11. Dynamic Threshold Analysis: classification of investment banks into the two 
identified two regimes based on Investment Banking Fees. 
Threshold: Investment Banking Fees                   
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Low regime 5% 6% 6% 6% 6% 11% 10% 13% 12% 15% 19% 15% 14% 
High regime 95% 94% 94% 94% 94% 89% 90% 88% 88% 85% 81% 85% 86% 
Notes: the Table shows the classification of the investment banks based on the investment banking fees threshold value that we obtained 
following Kremer’s et al. (2013) threshold model for dynamic panel. As threshold variable we use: Investment Banking Fees= net fees, 
commission and net trading income over total assets. 
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Table 12. Sensitivity analysis with liquidity as bank cost efficiency determinant. Models 1&2 
refer to dynamic panel results for banks that belong to a group and Models 3&4 for stand-alone 
investment banks. 
Variables Model(1) Model(2) Model(3) Model(4) 
     
Lag efficiency 0.434*** 0.491*** 0.355*** 0.223* 
 (0.0993) (0.119) (0.172) (0.176) 
Liquid assets/TA 0.105* 0.147** -0.103* -0.087** 
 (0.0645) (0.0707) (0.0652) (0.0430) 
Z-Score  0.015*  0.081** 
  (0.0076)  (0.0036) 
Investment banking fees/TA  0.388***  0.096 
  (0.145)  (0.091) 
E/TA -0.136       -0.179 0.043 -0.002 
 (0.120) (0.132) (0.079) (0.011) 
Securities/TA 0.244*** 
(0.0629) 
 
0.272*** 
(0.0592) 
 
0.079* 
(0.0472) 
0.211** 
(0.0831) 
Income diversification -0.021*** 
(0.0022) 
 
-0.023*** 
(0.0019) 
 
-0.102*** 
(0.0333) 
-0.102*** 
(0.0394) 
GDP per capita -0.290 -0.473*** -0.006 -0.008 
 (0.178) (0.172) (0.0319) (0.295) 
FDI inflows -0.009** -0.008*** -0.004 -0.006** 
 (0.0038) (0.0029) (0.0049) (0.003) 
FDI outflows 0.001 0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.0019) (0.00241) (0.0025) (0.0015) 
DCPS/GDP -0.086** -0.067 -0.093 -0.190 
 (0.041) (0.0444) (0.107) (0.11) 
Real effective exchange rate 0.001 0.001 -1.39e-06 0.001 
 (0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0018) (0.0013) 
House Price Index -0.001** -0.001* -0.000 -0.001 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0005) 
Stock Price Index -0.0006 -0.0005 -0.0075* -0.0006** 
 (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Burst of the asset bubble (dummy) -0.023 -0.020 0.019 0.009 
 (0.0159) (0.0194) (0.0139) (0.017) 
Reserves 0.084*** 0.051* 0.067* 0.061** 
 (0.0283) (0.0280) (0.0367) (0.0308) 
Volatility Implied Index -0.001 0.001 -7.19e-05 0.000347 
 (0.001) (0.0012) (0.0007) (0.0008) 
Constant 1.471 4.003** -0.187 -1.001 
 (1.958) (1.700) (3.938) (3.005) 
Wald test 365.63*** 1058.80*** 110.82*** 194.33*** 
Sargan (p-value) 36.98(0.35) 21.25(0.45) 18.65(0.52) 18.73(0.56) 
AR(1) -2.42** -2.13** -2.12** -2.22** 
AR(2) -1.156 -0.81851 1.1053 1.13 
Observations 390 390 219 219 
Number of instruments 23 23 23 23 
Number of banks 64 64 33 33 
Notes: the Table reports the regression results based on a fixed effect model over the period 1997 to 2010. The dependent 
variable is cost efficiency derived using a SFA methodology. As bank-specific independent variables we employ: Z-
Score= (1+ROE)/ (Standard Deviation of ROE); Investment Banking Fees= net fees, commission and trading income 
over total assets; Liquid assets over total assets; E/TA= equity over total assets; Income diversification= 1- |Net Interest 
Income-Other Operating Income|/Total Operating Income; Securities/TA= total securities over total assets.  As country 
variables we employ: GDP per capita; DCPS/GDP; FDI inflows; FDI outflows; Real Effective Exchange Rate; House 
price Index; Stock Price Index; Burst of the asset bubble (dummy); Reserves (natural logarithm); Volatility Implied Index. 
For bank-specific variables we use FITCH Bankscope database while for most country variables we use World 
Development indicators from World Bank. As House Price Index we use the index constructed by the Economist 
Intelligence Unit using as the base year the 1997. For Volatility Implied Index (VIX-Chicago Board Options Exchange 
Volatility Index) and Stock Price Index we use Bloomberg database. Windmeijer (2005) corrected (robust) standard 
errors are in parentheses. 
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Table 13. Sensitivity analysis with liquidity as threshold variable. Model 1 refers to dynamic 
panel threshold results for stand-alone banks and Model 2 for investment banks that belong 
to a group. 
                       Investment banks 
  
Threshold estimate                                                           Model (1)                                       Model (2) 
Liquidity 0.525295 0.314819 
95% confidence interval (0.289233-0.557692) (0.02081-0.541402) 
Impact of  Liquid Assets/TA                                        
λ1    -0.086** -0.105 
λ2       -0.008      -0.032 
Impact of covariates   
Z-Score                    0.004* 0.0068 
Investment Banking Fees/TA                    0.018 0.1040 
E/TA                     0.106*** 0.0630 
Securities/TA                     0.041 0.0420*** 
Income diversification                    -0.099*** -0.0155*** 
GDP per capita                    -0.448*** 0.1523 
FDI inflows                   -0.001 -0.0150** 
FDI outflows                   -0.001 -0.0013 
DCPS/GDP                   -0.014 -0.0071 
Real Effective Exchange Rate                    0.000 0.0003 
House Price Index                   -0.001* -0.0006** 
Stock Price Index                   -0.000 -0.0008** 
Burst of the asset bubble(dummy)                   -0.011 -0.0331** 
Reserves                    0.068 0.0400** 
Volatility Implied Index                   -0.000 -0.0025*** 
δ                     0.005 0.0022 
Observations 219 390 
Low regime 160  137 
High regime 59 253 
Notes: the Table reports the estimations for the dynamic panel threshold model. Each regime has at least 5% of the 
observations (Hansen, 1999). The liquidity threshold value for non-banking group ranges between 0.289233 and 
0.557693 while for banking group banks between 0.02081 and 0.541402. We denote as dependent variable banks’ 
efficiency scores (𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑡) , while as the threshold and the regime dependent variable we impose the liquidity 
(𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡), which represents bank’s liquid assets over total assets. Following Bick (2007), the model accounts for 
regime dependent intercepts (δ). We assume 𝑚𝑖𝑡 includes bank-specific and country explanatory variables. For bank-
specific variables we use: Z-Score= (1+ROE)/ (Standard Deviation of ROE); Investment Banking Fees= net fees, 
commission and trading income over total assets; Securities/TA= total securities over total assets; Income 
diversification= 1- |Net Interest Income-Other Operating Income|/Total Operating Income; E/TA= equity over total 
assets. As country variables we employ: GDP per capita; DCPS/GDP; FDI inflows; FDI outflows; Real Effective 
Exchange Rate; House price Index; Stock Price Index; Burst of the asset bubble (dummy); Reserves (natural 
logarithm); Volatility Implied Index. For bank-specific variables we use FITCH Bankscope database while for most 
country variables we use World Development indicators from World Bank. As House Price Index we use the index 
constructed by the Economist Intelligence Unit using as the base year the 1997. For Volatility Implied Index (VIX-
Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index) and Stock Price Index we use Bloomberg database. Also as 
endogenous variable for the model we impose Z-Score, where 𝑍 − 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 = 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑡−1. We check that there is not a 
high level of correlation between the variables used in the models. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% 
significance levels respectively.                                   
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Table 14. Dynamic Threshold Analysis: classification of investment banks into the two 
identified regimes based on liquidity (stand-alone and group-banks). 
Panel A: Liquidity 
(stand-alone banks) 
                        
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Low regime 73% 77% 79% 74% 62% 80% 71% 77% 77% 80% 60% 67% 63% 
High regime 27% 23% 21% 26% 38% 20% 29% 23% 23% 20% 40% 33% 37% 
Panel B: Liquidity 
(group-banks) 
                        
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Low regime 55% 47% 32% 28% 28% 38% 33% 44% 43% 36% 44% 41% 37% 
High regime 45% 53% 68% 72% 72% 62% 67% 56% 57% 64% 56% 59% 63% 
Notes: the Table shows the classification of the investment banks (stand-alone and group-banks) based on the threshold values that 
we obtained following Kremer’s et al. (2013) threshold model for dynamic panel. As threshold variable we use the ratio of liquid 
assets over total assets.  The low regime stands for the percentage of banks that have bank-specific values for the liquidity measure 
below the threshold, while the high regime stands for the percentages of banks that have bank-specific values above the liquidity 
threshold value. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
43 
 
List of Figures 
Figure 1.Number of issued shares of domestic companies (Domestic Market Capitalization 
as % of GDP) across the G7 and Switzerland (2000-2010).  
Notes: the Figure shows the  Domestic Market Capitalization (as % of GDP) across G7 and Switzerland countries 
(2000-2010). The left axis includes values that correspond to the US, the UK, France, Italy, Germany, Japan and 
Canada. The right axis includes only values that correspond to Switzerland. For Domestic Market Capitalization 
(as % of GDP) data we use World Development indicators from  the World Bank. 
Figure 2. M&A activity transaction value across the G7 and Switzerland (2000-2010). 
Notes: the Figure shows the M&A transaction value in billion dollars across G7 and Switzerland (2000-2010). The 
left axis includes M&A transaction values that correspond to the UK, France, Italy, Germany, Switzerland, Japan and 
Canada. The right axis stands for values that correspond to M&A market in the US. For M&A transaction value we 
use the Thomson One Banker database. 
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              Figure 3. Volatility Implied Index (VIX) over the 1997-2010 period.
Notes: the Figure shows the average VIX (Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index) over the 
period 1990-2012. Source: Bloomberg. 
 
Figure 4. Mean efficiency score of investment banks over the 1997-2010 period.
Notes: the Figure shows the average efficiency score of investment banks derived from Stochastic Frontier 
Analysis (SFA). 
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